Book Reviews

Additions to the Bibliography on Mind and Consciousness

compiled by Piero Scaruffi

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Gallistel Charles: THE ORGANIZATION OF ACTION (Erlbaum, 1980)

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Galton Antony: TEMPORAL LOGICS (Academic Press, 1987)

Six essays from authoritative researchers in the field of temporal logic. Galton provides an overview of both the first-order (Davidson, McDermott, Allen, Kowalski) and the modal (Prior's) approaches. Sadri discusses in detail Kowalski's calculus of events, Lee's logic of time and events, Allen's temporal logic. Galton presents his logic of occurrence
In his logic of aspect an event-radical is a complete expression that is neither a proposition nor a name, but it denotes an event type. Occurrences are event tokens: each single occurrence of an event type is an occurrence. Aspect operators (perfect, progressive and prospective) are applied to event-radicals to yield propositions. Such operators express the occurrence of events in time. The logic of occurrence is the logic of such operators.


Galton Antony: THE LOGIC OF ASPECT (Clarendon Press, 1984)

"Aspect" refers to the fact that every verb has two forms, the imperfective (used to describe an action in progress) and perfective (used to describe a completed action). Aspect is related to tense: aspect determines how tense has to be interpreted (e.g., perfective aspect is incompatible with present tense).
Prior worked out a logic of tenses. Galton extends that logic by introducing a distinction between events (which are perfective) and states (imperfective). States "obtain" in moments, whereas events "occur" in intervals. Aspects are treated like operators. Prior's two temporal operators are still applied to states to obtain new states but two new operators transform events into states and two more transform states into events.


Gamut L.T.F.: LOGIC, LANGUAGE AND MEANING (University of Chicago, 1990)

J. Benthem, J. Groenendijk, D. De Jongh, M. Stokhof and H. Verkuyl provide a broad introduction to the standard and intensional logics, pragmatics and Montague's grammar.


Ganti Tibor: THE PRINCIPLE OF LIFE (Omikk, 1971)

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Gardenfors, Peter: HOW HOMO BECAME SAPIENS (Oxford Univ Press, 2003)

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Gardner Howard: MIND'S NEW SCIENCE (Basic, 1985)

A history of cognitive research, that spans cybernetics, neurophysiology (Lashley, Hebb), philosophy of the mind (Ryle, Wittgenstein, Austin), psychology (Miller, James, Kohler, Bartlett, Piaget), artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, biology (Gibson, Marr).


Gardner Howard: FRAMES OF MIND (Basic, 1983)

Gardner argues that there is no single, unified, indivisible intelligence, but rather a set of independent intellectual competences: linguistic, logical, musical, kinesthetic, spatial, interpersonal and intrapersonal. IQ tests should be revised accordingly. Gardner finds the biological foundations of intelligence in the plasticity of the neural system during development. The fact that his unscientific view has been so influential in Psychology tells how unscientific Psychology still is.


Gardner Howard: INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED (Basic, 1999)

The American psychologist Gardner retells his story of multiple intelligences, but doesn't make it sound more scientific at all. It just proves how vague and ultimately misleading the term "intelligence" can be.


Garnham Alan & Oakhill Jane: THINKING AND REASONING (Blackwell, 1994)

A cognitive psychology approach to inference (deduction and induction), creativity, common sense and the development of cognition.


Gazdar Gerald: PRAGMATICS (Academic Press, 1979)

Pragmatics studies aspects of meaning that cannot be accounted for by reference to truth conditions. Pragmatics deals with meaning minus truth conditions, or meaning minus semantics. In his approach to the field Gazdar employs a formalist methodology analogous to the one applied By Montague to semantics.
Gazdar offers a critique of the theory of illocutionary force based on the performative hypothesis (that the deep structure of every sentence contains a performative verb).
After recapitualting Grice's treatment of implicatures and four maxims, Gazdar proposes to replace the quality maxim with "say only that which you know", so that implicatures due to the maxim of quality (both scalar implicatures and clausal implicatures) can be treated as Hintikka's epistemic implications, thereby solving the "projection problem" (how the presuppositions of a sentence are determined by those of its components).
After a reasoned critique of existing treatments of presupposition (Hausser, Katz, Langendoen, Stalnaker, Karttunen), Gazdar offers his definition, drawing from Hamblin's "commitment store" model of dialogue and Bar-Hillel's view of an utterance as the pair of a sentence and a context. Gazdar offers an inductive definition of context (a set of propositions constrained only by consistency) and uses Stalnaker's pragmatic definition of sentence meaning.


Gazdar Gerald: GENERALIZED PHRASE STRUCTURE GRAMMAR (MIT Press, 1985)

Gazdar abandons the transformational component and the deep structure of Chomsky's model of grammar and focuses on rules that analyze syntactic trees rather than generate them. They translate natural language sentences in an intensional logic which is a variant of lambda calculus.
Gazdar's grammar describes only context-free languages and exhibits mathematical properties that, unlike Chomsky's grammar, can be scientifically tested and falsified. A phrase-structure rule is not a generative rule but a condition of compliance for a syntactic tree. The semantic interpretation of a sentence is derived directly from its syntactic representation.
Gazdar defines 43 rules of grammar each providing a phrase-structure rule and a semantic-translation rule that shows how to build an intensional-logic expression from the intensional-logic expressions of the constituents of the phrase-structure rule. Gazdar employs meta-rules to produce new rules (and therefore derived categories) from the existing rules.


Gazzaniga Michael & etc.: THE COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCES (MIT Press, 1995)

A colossal introduction to the field in the form of articles written by specialists. Chapters include: sensory systems, motor system, attention, memory, language, thought and imagery, emotion, consciousness. Each chapter provides neurophysiological bases for the understanding of a psychological phenomenon.


Gazzaniga Michael & LeDoux Joseph: INTEGRATED MIND (Plenum, 1978)

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Gazzaniga Michael: SOCIAL BRAIN (Basic, 1985)

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Gazzaniga Michael: NATURE'S MIND (Basic, 1992)

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Gazzaniga Michael: THE MIND's PAST (UC Press, 1998)

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Gazzaniga Michael: THE MIND's PAST (UC Press, 1998)

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Genesereth Michael & Nilsson Nils: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Morgan Kaufman, 1987)

A textbook on Artificial Intelligence that covers production systems (predicate calculus, deduction, resolution), some nonmonotonic logics (closed-world assumption, circumscription, default theory), inductive learning, probabilistic reasoning, logics of belief, and planning. The last chapter attempts to define an intelligent agent at three levels: a tropistic agent, that simply reacts to the environment; a hysteretic agent, that has an internal state; and a knowlegde-level agent, whose internal state is basically determined by a production system.


Gell-Mann, Murray: THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR (W.H.Freeman, 1994)

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Geraci, Robert: Apocalyptic A.I. (Oxford, 2010)

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Gibbs, Ray: POETICS OF MIND (Cambridge Univ Press, 1994)

A treatise on how metaphor is interpreted by using the speaker's intentions


Gibson James Jerome: THE SENSES CONSIDERED AS PERCEPTUAL SYSTEMS (Houghton Mifflin, 1966)

Gibson originated "ecological realism", the view that meaning is located in the interaction of living things and the environment. Perceiving is a process of picking up information that is available in the environment. Perception is a constant process and consists in detecting the invariants. The function of the brain is to orient the organs of perception for seeking and extracting information from the continous energy flow of the environment. Perception cannot be separated from the environment in which the perceptive system evolved and from the information which is present in that environment. There is much more information in the world and less in the head than was traditionally assumed. The environment must be viewed as a source of stimulation.
Conscious sensation and perception are two different things and they are often independent. Perceptual systems are sources of information. Sensations are sources of conscious qualities. The inflow of information does not always coincide with the inflow of sensations. Therefore, a study of sensations is not very useful to a study of perceptions.
Perceptual organs are not passive. They can orient themselves to pick up information, to "resonate" with the information in the environment. Gibson goes to a great length to explain the details of their functioning.


Gibson James Jerome: THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PERCEPTION (Houghton Mifflin, 1979)

According to Gibson the correct context for a theory of action is not the abstract space of objects and their relationships but the real world of shapes and colors as it is presented by the senses. Perception and action are not separate processes. Organisms move in the world using all the information that is available in it.
Information originates from the interaction between the organism and its environment.
An "affordance" measures conjunctions between the characteristics of the organism and the environment. All the potential uses of an object constitute the activities it affords (e.g. a pen affords writing). Such uses are directly perceivable.
Gibson uses vision to explain what awareness is and what it is not. Body and mind constitute a false dichotomy. Awareness is both physical and mental. Awareness is a function performed by a living observer, the whole living being, not just its mind or its body. Awareness is a biological phenomenon. Perceiving is keeping in touch with the world. The observer is not external to the world, and therefore her/his awareness cannot be a state outside the world (i.e., in a different substance called "mind"). Cognition is a biological phenomenon, and it is both mind and body. Awareness is both mind and body.


Ginsberg Matthew: ESSENTIALS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (Morgan Kaufmann, 1993)

A short introduction to the field.


Ginsberg Matthew: READINGS IN NONMONOTONIC LOGIC (Morgan Kaufmann, 1987)

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Gisolfi Carl & Mora Francisco: THE HOT BRAIN (MIT Press, 2000)

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Glass Leon & Mackey Michael: FROM CLOCKS TO CHAOS (Princeton University Press, 1988)

The authors propose nonlinear models for dynamic processes occuring in body organs (biological oscillators).


Gleick James: CHAOS (Viking, 1987)

The best seller that made chaos theory fashionable. Besides exposing the theory in ordinary language, and highlighting its applications to many different disciplines, it provides a picturesque chronicle of the field. Chaos theory is about finding regularities in the irregular behaviors of nature, i.e. in the behavior of nonlinear systems. Chaotic systems are a subset of nonlinear systems in which small changes in initial conditions yield big changes in behavior.


Glezer Vadim: VISION AND MIND (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1995)

Starting from a description of how the visual system works, Glezer develops a detailed neural theory of how categories are formed from sensory inputs through functional organization of neural structures.
The mind somehow models the external world. Comprehension of the world is achieved through functional modules in the neocortex, whose first task is to segment the sensory input. This is done in a way consistent with Gabor's quantum theory of information (indeterminacy between the description of signals in space and in spatial-frequency domains, i.e. duality between space and spectrum). The harmonics of each module have different properties (a Fourier analysis is provided).
An invariant representation of the object is localized in the left emisphere, i.e. the left emisphere uses a classification approach for recognition, whereas the right emisphere uses a structural approach. Invariance emerges as a property of neural nets and Hebbian learning (an algorithm for the production of invariant representations of an image is provided).


Globus, Gordon: THE POSTMODERN BRAIN (John Benjamins, 1995)

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Gluck, Mark & Rumelhart David: NEUROSCIENCE AND CONNECTIONIST THEORY (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1990)

A collection of articles on how brain regions can be modeled to account for function, complexity and power.


Goddard Cliff & Wierzbicka Anna: SEMANTIC AND LEXICAL UNIVERSALS (Benjamins, 1994)

A collection of papers on the theme of Leibniz's universal alphabet of thought, the set of semantic and lexical universals that are supposed to be common to all languages. At the end Wierzbicka gives a critical account of all the primitives (37 of them) that have been identified. "Canonical" sentences are those constructed out of such primitives.


Goertzel Ben: THE EVOLVING MIND (Gordon & Breach, 1993)

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Goldberg David: GENETIC ALGORITHMS (Addison Wesley, 1989)

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Goldberg Elk: THE EXECUTIVE BRAIN (Oxford Univ Press, 2001)
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Goldstein Kurt: THE ORGANISM: A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO BIOLOGY (American Book, 1939)
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Goodale, Melvyn & Milner, David: THE VISUAL BRAIN IN ACTION (Oxford University Press, 1995)

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Goodale, Melvyn & Milner, David: SIGHT UNSEEN (Oxford Univ Press, 2004)

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Goodwin Brian: HOW THE LEOPARD CHANGED ITS SPOTS (Charles Scribner, 1994)

The organism, and not the gene, should be the focus of attention for evolutionary biologists. Goodwin argues in favor of a theory of morphogenesis as a process that is inherently ordered. Genes' instructions are constrained by a principle of order.


Gopnik, Alison: "The Philosophical Baby" (Farrar, 2009)

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Goswami, Amit: THE SELF-AWARE UNIVERSE (Putnam, 1993)

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Gould Stephen Jay: ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY (harvard University Press, 1977)

Gould reviews the debate on "recapitulation", the idea that ontogeny (individual development) recapitulates phylogeny (species development) and advances a theory that views "heterochrony" (changes in developmental timing that producing parallels between ontogeny and phylogeny) as evolutionary crucial. Retardation (delayed growth and development), for example, has probably been fundamental for the evolution of humans, by prolonging into later life rapid brain growth and therefore an increase in cerebralization.


Gould Stephen Jay: EVER SINCE DARWIN (Deutsch, 1978)

An accessible introduction to darwinism, neo-darwinism and Gould's own theory of punctuated equilibria (changes appear suddenly in lineages) and non-repeatability of evolution (if evolution had to happen again, it would not repeat itself).
The paleontological record shows no steady progress in the development of higher organisms. Evolution seems to proceed in bursts.
Consciousness is probably the latest burst of evolutionary development.
Gould also touches on theories of the earth and the nature of science.


Gould Stephen Jay: WONDERFUL LIFE (Norton, 1989)

A popular introduction to the significance of the findings of the Burgess Shale. Gould advances intriguing hypotheses: any replay of the tape of life would yield a different, unpredictable evolutionary history, but still a meaningful one. Evolution is not in the hands of determinism and not in the hands of randomness, but in the hands of contingency. In the case of the creatures of the Burgess shale, survival was so unlikely that chance events may well have shaped evolution more than fitness. Humans exist because of a lucky chain of events that led to them, but they might have as well never been created.


Gould Stephen Jay: FULL HOUSE (Random House, 1996)

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Graf Peter & Masson Michael: IMPLICIT MEMORY (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1993)

A technical introduction to the field of explicit and implicit memory. Each chapter is written by an expert in the field. Implicit memories are those in which experiences influence performance in the absence of specific intention to recollect them.


Graubard Stephen: THE ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE DEBATE (MIT Press, 1988)

A collection of more or less philosophical articles on the feasibility of Artificial Intelligence. Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus draw from Heidegger and Wittgenstein to affirm their conception of a holistic intelligence, that cannot be broken down into knowledge representation systems or neural networks, of an intelligence that is driven by intentions which reflect the environment. Putnam even downplays the historical importance of Artificial Intelligence.
The book also contains introductions to current research in connectionist models, machine vision, etc.


Green David: COGNITIVE SCIENCE (Blackwell, 1996)


A textbook on cognitive science that covers the history and the main topics of this discipline in a conversational style.


Green Georgia: PRAGMATICS (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1989)

Pragmatics is defined as the study of understanding intentional human action. Therefore it must deal with belief, goal, plan and act. Green surveys indexical and anaphoric expressions (expressions whose reference cannot be determined without taking into account the context, such as pronouns and demonstratives, whose interpretation requires inferences about the speaker's intended referent), sense and reference (Frege's distinction of extension and intension, Kripke's and Putnam's casual theory of names, Kripke's distinction of rigid designators and non-rigid designators in the context of possible worlds, and Montague's intensional logic in which the sense of an expression is supposed to determine its reference)
Green deals at length with illocutionary force (what action an utterance is performing) and presupposition (the facts that are taken for granted), two linguistic phenomena without which many utterances could not be evaluated. Grice's maxims are presented as the basis to assess the coherence of a discourse. Metaphor is treated as something different from implicature (indirect speech), but similar in terms of the strategies that must be employed to understand it.


Greene Robert: HUMAN MEMORY (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1992)

A comprehensive survey of cognitive models from the perspective of cognitive psychology.


Greenfield Susan: THE HUMAN MIND EXPLAINED (Henry Holt & Co, 1996)

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Greenfield, Susan: JOURNEY TO THE CENTERS OF THE MIND (W.H.Freeman, 1995)

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Greenfield, Susan: THE HUMAN BRAIN (Basic, 1999)

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Gregersen, Niels: FROM COMPLEXITY TO LIFE (Oxford Univ Press, 2003)

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Gregory Richard: MIND IN SCIENCE (Cambridge University Press, 1981)

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Gregory Richard: OXFORD COMPANION TO THE MIND (Oxford, 1987)

A monumental, detailed, accurate reference book. An alphabetical dictionary of mental phenomena and brain anatomy, spanning psychology, philosophy and neurophysiology. Each entry is written by experts in the field and reviews the state of the art on the subject.


Grice Paul: ASPECTS OF REASON (Oxford Univ Press, 2001)

This book collects the John Locke lectures of the late 1970s, that show Grice tackling the issue of reasoning. "Practical necessities" are necessary because they are derivable.


Grice H. Paul: STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (Harvard Univ Press, 1989)

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Grice Paul: ASPECTS OF REASON (Oxford Univ Press, 2001)

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Griffin Donald: ANIMAL THINKING (Harvard University Press, 1984)

A study of animals' minds. Griffin claims that smaller brains have a greater need to think because they can store fewer information. The only way they can cope with their environment is by thinking more.


Grishman Ralph: COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS (Cambridge, 1986)

An introduction to the field (syntax, semantics, discourse analysis and language generation) that provides detailed discussions of various parsing techniques, a brief discussion on anaphora resolution, a survey of frames and scripts.


Grossberg Stephen: NEURAL NETWORKS AND NATURAL INTELLIGENCE (MIT Press, 1988)

The book explores a number of phenomena and proposes a potential explanation in terms of neural dynamics.
Grossberg's connectionist model, consistent with Hebb's law and Pavlov's conditioning, reduces a cognitive state to a dynamic state of "adaptive resonance", expressed by a non-linear, non-stable and non-local algorithm.
The essential element of the cognitive system is the long-lasting state of adaptive resonance reached when the feedback matches the input pattern. Inspired by Helmholtz, Grossberg thinks that we perceive the sensory data only when a consensus is reached between what the data are and what we expect them to be, given what we already know. This competetive negotiation is reached through a feedback process. Grossberg's theory of memory is nonlinear, nonlocal and nonstationary.


Grosz Barbara: READINGS IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING (Morgan Kaufman, 1986)

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Gupta Anil & Belnap Nuel: THE REVISION THEORY OF TRUTH (MIT Press, 1993)

According to Gupta's revision theory of truth, originally formulated in the early 80's, truth is a circular concept. Therefore all paradoxes that arise from circular reasoning in classical logic fall into normality in Gupta's theory of truth.
In Gupta's "revisionist theory of truth" truth is refined step by step. In order to determine all the sentences of a language that are true when that language includes a truth predicate (a predicate that refers to truth), one needs to determine whether that predicate is true, which in turn requires one to know that the extension of true is, while such extension is precisely the goal. The solution is to assume an initial extension of "true" and then gradually refine it.


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