Additions to the Bibliography on Mind and Consciousness
compiled by Piero Scaruffi
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Sadock, Jerrold: TOWARD A LINGUISTIC THEORY OF SPEECH ACTS (Academic Press, 1974)Salthe, Stanley: EVOLVING HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS (Columbia University Press, 1985)Salthe, Stanley: DEVELOPMENT AND EVOLUTION (MIT Press, 1993)His approach is non-darwinian to the extent that development, and not evolution, is the fundamental process in self-organization. Evolution is merely the result of a margin of error. His theory rests on a bold fusion of hierarchy theory, information theory and semiotics. Salthe is looking for a grand theory of nature, which turns out to be essentially a theory of change, which turns out to be essentially a theory of emergence. Savage, Leonard: THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICS (John Wiley, 1954)Satinover, Jeffrey: THE QUANTUM BRAIN (John Wiley, 2001)Schacter, Daniel L.: SEARCHING FOR MEMORY (Basic, 1997)Schacter, Daniel & Tulving, Endel: MEMORY SYSTEMS (MIT Press, 1994)Alan Baddeley describes working memory as the interface between memory and cognition. A few essays deal with the role of the hippocampus. Schacter, Daniel: SEARCHING FOR MEMORY (Basic Books, 1996)Schank, Roger: CONCEPTUAL INFORMATION PROCESSING (North Holland, 1975)Schank, Roger: DYNAMIC MEMORY (Cambridge Univ Press, 1982)Schank, Roger: SCRIPTS, PLANS, GOALS, AND UNDERSTANDING (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1977)Schank, Roger: TELL ME A STORY (Scribner, 1990)Schank Roger: THE COGNITIVE COMPUTER (Addison-Wesley, 1984)Schrodinger, Erwin: WHAT IS LIFE (Cambridge Univ Press, 1944)Life displays two fundamental process: creating order from order (the progeny has the same order as the parent) and creating order from disorder (as every living system does at every metabolic step). Living systems seem to defy the second law of thermodynamics. In reality they live in a world of energy flux that does not confomr to the closed-world assumptions of thermodynamics. An organism stays alive in its highly organized state by absorbing energy from the environment and processing it to produce a lower entropy state within itself. Schmalhausen, Ivan: FACTORS OF EVOLUTION (Blakiston, 1949)Schmajuk, Nestor: ANIMAL LEARNING AND COGNITION (Cambridge Univ Press, 1996)Schneider, Eric & Sagan, Dorion: INTO THE COOL (Univ of Chicago Press, 2005)Schwartz Eric: COMPUTATIONAL NEUROSCIENCE (MIT Press, 1990)Scott, Alwyn: STAIRWAY TO THE MIND (Copernicus, 1995)Searle John: SPEECH ACTS (Cambridge Univ Press, 1969)Searle John: EXPRESSION AND MEANING (Cambridge Univ Press, 1979)Searle John: INTENTIONALITY (Cambridge University Press, 1983)Searle John: MIND, BRAINS AND SCIENCE (BBC Publications, 1984)Searle John: FOUNDATIONS OF ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC (Cambridge Univ Press, 1985)Searle John: THE MYSTERY OF CONSCIOUSNESS (New York Review, 1997)Searle John: THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND (MIT Press, 1992)Searle John: CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY (Free Press, 1995)Searle John: MIND, LANGUAGE AND SOCIETY (Basic, 1998)Sebeok Thomas Albert: SIGNS (Univ of Toronto Press, 1994)Sebeok Thomas Albert: CONTRIBUTION TO A DOCTRINE OF SIGNS (Indian Univ, 1976)Peter Sedlmeier: FREQUENCY PROCESSING AND COGNITION (Oxford, 2002)Sellars Wilfrid: SCIENCE, PERCEPTION AND REALITY (Humanities Press, 1963)Among nature's ultimate constituents must be the senses, which account for the quality of things. Each property of an object must be present in its constituents, and that includes the sensations that the object creates in us. Selz Otto: ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DES PRODUKTIVEN DENKENS UND DES IRRTUMS (#, 1922)A schema is a network of concepts that organize past experience. Representation of present experience is a partially complete scheme. By comparing the two representations one can infer something relative to the present situation. Thanks to the schema's anticipatory nature, to solve a problem is equivalent to comprehend it, and comprehending ultimately means reducing the current situation to a past situation. Semon Richard: DIE MNEME (1904)Shackle George: Decision, order and time (Cambridge Univ Press, 1961)Shafer, Glenn: A MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF EVIDENCE (Princeton Univ Press, 1976)Shafer, Glenn & Pearl, Judea: READINGS IN UNCERTAIN REASONING (Morgan Kaufmann, 1990)A section is devoted to Decision Analysis: a historical overview by Shafer, an introduction by Warner North, an article on influence diagrams by Ross Shachter. A section is devoted to Artificial Intelligence techniques for reasoning under uncertainty, with articles by Paul Cohen and Rodney Brooks, and, fo course, articles on MYCIN. A section deals with belief functions (Dempster-Shafer's theory). Only one article touches on fuzzy logic. Shannon, Claude & Weaver, Warren: THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION (Univ of Illinois Press, 1949)The quality of a message as it is transformed from the source to the destination is a function of channel capacity and noise. Noise is a random process that can be described in terms of statistical probabilities. Entropy is the statistical state of knowledge about a question: the entropy of a question is related to the probability assigned to all the possible answers to that question. Information is the difference between two entropies. Shapiro, Stuart Charles: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (John Wiley, 1992)Shastri, Lokendra: SEMANTIC NETWORKS, AN EVIDENTIAL FORMULATION AND ITS CONNECTIONIST REALIZATION (Morgan Kaufman, 1988)Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine: THE ROOTS OF THINKING (Temple Univ Press, 1990)Sheets-Johnstone, Maxine: THE PRIMACY OF MOVEMENT (John Benjamins, 1981)Sheldrake, Rupert: A NEW SCIENCE OF LIFE (J.P. Tarcher, 1981)Sheldrake, Rupert: THE PRESENCE OF THE PAST (Times Books, 1988)Shepard, Roger & Cooper, Lynn: MENTAL IMAGES (MIT Press, 1986)Shepard thinks that species survived natural selection by developing innate structures to operate in their environment. Shermer, Michael: "Heavens on Earth" (2018)Click here for the full review Shlain, Leonard: SEX, TIME, AND POWER (2003)Click here for the full review Shlain, Leonard: THE ALPHABET VERSUS THE GODDESS (1998)Click here for the full review Shlain, Leonard: ART AND PHYSICS (1991)Click here for the full review Shettleworth, Sara: COGNITION, EVOLUTION AND BEHAVIOR (Oxford Univ Press, 1998)Click here for the full review Shoham, Yoav: REASONING ABOUT CHANGE (MIT Press, 1988)Shoham's preference logic, based on conditional logic, prescribes how to select the best interpretation from a partially ordered set of interpretations according to a criterion of minimality (minimize changes that may occur). Preference logic's expressive power is higher than any other non-monotonic logic. Shubin, Neil: "Your Inner Fish" (2009)Shubin, Neil: "The Universe Within" (2013)Simon, Herbert: MODELS OF THOUGHT (Yale University Press, 1979)Simon, Herbert: THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL (MIT Press, 1969)No complex system can survive unless it is organized as a hierarchy of subsystems. The entire universe must be hierarchical, otherwise it would not exist. Simpson, Patrick: ARTIFICIAL NEURAL SYSTEMS (Pergamon, 1990)Sloman, Aaron: THE COMPUTER REVOLUTION IN PHILOSOPHY (Harvester Press, 1978)The book explores the relation between emotional states and cognitive states. Sloman, Steven & Fernbach, Philip: "The Knowledge Illusion" (2017)Smith, Edward: CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS (Harvard University Press, 1981)Maynard Smith, John & Szathmary, Eors: THE ORIGINS OF LIFE (Oxford University Press, 1999)Click here for the full review Maynard Smith, John & Szathmary, Eors: THE MAJOR TRANSITIONS IN EVOLUTION (W. H. Freeman, 1995)Click here for the full review Maynard Smith, John: THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION (Cambridge University Press, 1993)Maynard Smith, John: EVOLUTIONARY GENETICS (Oxford University Press, 1989)Maynard Smith, John: GAMES, SEX AND EVOLUTION (Harvester, 1988)Maynard Smith, John: EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES (Cambridge University Press, 1982)Smolin, Lee: "Time Reborn" (2013)Snyder, Frederick: EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF DREAMING (Random House, 1967)Solomon, Robert: TRUE TO OUR FEELINGS (Oxford University Press, 2007)Solomon, Robert: THINKING ABOUT FEELING (Oxford University Press, 2004)Solso, Robert & Massaro, Dominic: THE SCIENCE OF THE MIND (Oxford University Press, 1995)Sombe, Lea: REASONING UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION (Wiley, 1990)Sowa, John: CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURES (Addison-Wesley, 1984)Conceptual graphs, based on Peirce's existential graphs (a graph notation for logic), are a system of logic for representing natural language semantics. Conceptual graphs are finite, connected, bipartite graphs (bipartite because they contain both concepts and conceptual relations, boxes and circles). Some concepts (concrete concepts) are associated with percepts for experiencing the world and with motor mechanisms for acting upon it. Some concepts are associated with the items of language. A concept has both a type and a referent. A hierarchy of concept types defines the relationships between concepts at different levels of generality. The type hierarchy includes both natural types (e.g., "gold") and role types (e.g., "precious stone"), forms a lattice and represents intensions (senses). Formation rules ("copy", "restrict", "join" and "simplify") constitute a generative grammar for conceptual structures just like production rules constitute a generative grammar for syntactic structures. All deductions on conceptual graphs involve a combination of them. Sowa defines generalization and specialization, abstraction and definition (through lambda abstraction), aggregation (for plurals) and individuation. Conceptual graphs can be translated to predicate calculus formulas, except those that have context-dependent features. Schemata incorporate domain-specific knowledge. A concept type may be linked to any number of schemata, each schema representing a perspective on one way its concept type may be used. A concept type may also be linked to a prototype. A discourse context is represented by a concept with one or more conceptual graphs nested inside the referent field. There is an isomorphism between Peirce's contexts, Kamp's contexts and Sowa's contexts, Kamp's rules for resolving discourse referents can be used in conceptual graphs as well. Conceptual graphs can distinguish extensional models of the world from intensional propositions on the world. The interpretation function relates the graphs of the formulas to the graphs of the models. Tarski's model theory can be adapted to graphical representations by seeing each node as an object and each arc as a relation. Solms, Mark: THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF DREAMS (Erlbaum, 1997)Sowa, John: PRINCIPLES OF SEMANTIC NETWORKS (Morgan Kaufman, 1991)Spellman, William: "A Brief History of Death" (2014)Sperber, Dan & Wilson Deirdre: RELEVANCE, COMMUNICATION AND COGNITION (Blackwell, 1995)Relevance constraints discourse's coherence and enables its understanding. Relevance is a relation between a proposition and a set of contextual assumptions: a proposition is relevant in a context if and only if it has at least one contextual implication in that context. The contextual implications of a proposition in a context are all the propositions that can be deduced from the union of the proposition with the context. Relevance is achieved when the addition of a sentence to a discourse modifies the context in a manner which is not trivial, i.e. which is not only the sum of the context plus the new sentence plus all its implications. A universal goal in communication is that the hearer is out to acquire relevant information. Another universal goal is that the speaker tries to make his utterance as relevant as possible. Understanding an utterance consists then in finding an interpretation which is consistent with the principle of relevance. The principle of relevance holds that any act of ostensive communication also includes a guarantee of its own optimal relevance. This principle is proven to subsume Grice's maxims. Relevance can arise in three ways: interaction with assumptions which yields new assumptions, contradiction of an assumption which removes it, additional evidence for an assumption which strengthens the confidence in it. Implicatures are either contextual assumptions or contextual implications that the hearer must grasp to recognize the speaker as observing the principle of relevance. Utterance comprehension is reduced to a process of hypothesis formation and confirmation: the best hypothesis about the speaker's intentions and expectations is the one that best satisfies the principle of relevance. The nondemonstrative inference processes involved in the derivation of implicatures consist in 1. detecting the implicated premises (through a nondeductive process of hypothesis formation and confirmation), and 2. in deducting the implicated conclusions from the implicated premises and the proposition expressed by the utterance. Stalnaker, Robert: INQUIRY (MIT Press, 1984)Stalnaker believes that possible worlds are not concrete worlds, but simply ways the world might be. A proposition is a function from possible worlds to truth-values. Each world provides a truth value for a proposition. Standage, Tom: "An Edible History of Humanity" (2009)Stapp, Henry: MIND, MATTER AND QUANTUM MECHANICS (Springer-Verlag, 1993)Stefik Mark: AN INTRODUCTION TO KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS (Morgan Kaufmann, 1995)Steiglitz, Ken: "The Discrete Charm of the Machine" (2019)Stenning, Keith: SEEING REASON (Oxford Univ Press, 2002)Sterelny, Kim: THE REPRESENTATIONAL THEORY OF MIND (Basil Blackwell, 1991)Sternberg, Robert: HANDBOOK OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (Cambridge, 1982)Sternberg, Robert: WISDOM (Cambridge University Press, 1990)Sternberg, Robert: METAPHORS OF MIND (Cambridge Univ Press, 1990)Stevens, Anthony: ARCHETYPE (Routledge, 1982)Stevens, Anthony: PRIVATE MYTHS (Harvard Univ Press, 1995)Stewart, John: "Evolution's Arrow" (Chapman Press, 2000)Stich, Stephen: FROM FOLK PSYCHOLOGY TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE (MIT Press, 1983)Stich assumes that cognitive states correspond to syntactic states in such a way that causal relationships between syntactic states (or between syntactic states and stimuli and actions) correspond to syntactic relationships of corresponding syntactic objects. Stich's "autonomy principle" states that differences between organisms that cannot be reduced to differences in their internal states are not relevant for a psychological theory. The only environmental factors that should be taken into account are those that cause differences in the internal states. Stich, Stephen: THE FRAGMENTATION OF REASON (MIT Press, 199#)Further thoughts on Stich's theory of commonsense reasoning. Stich, Stephen: DECONSTRUCTING THE MIND (Oxford Univ Press, 1996)These are essays against eliminativism, the idea that there is a folk psychology (a theory of mind implied in our ordinary language) and that such folk psycholody is plain wrong and that it is wrong in assuming the existence of such things as beliefs and desires and other intentional states. Stich object to each of the three parts of eliminativism. Stich points out that naive physics and many other commonsense theories work perfectly well to account for the world. Folk psychology provides a similar frame of reference, based on causal-historical chains. It is useful as description, explanation and prediction of people's behavior, as "mental simulation". Stillings, Neil: COGNITIVE SCIENCE (MIT Press, 1995)Strawson Galen: MENTAL REALITY (MIT Press, 1994)Since the current notions of the physical and the mental are incompatible, one set ought to be changed. Eliminativists believe that the terminology of the mental is wrong and should be abandoned, but he thinks that it's the terminology of the physical which is inadequate and outdated.
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